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Abstract

Information security is still a major problem for users of websites and hybrid mobile applications. While
many apps and websites come with terms of service agreements between the developer and end user, there
is no rigorous mechanism in place to ensure that these agreements are being followed. Formal methods can
offer greater confidence that these policies are being followed, but there is currently no widely adopted tool
that makes formal methods available for average consumers. After studying the current state-of-the-art in
JavaScript policy enforcement and verification, this research proposes several new techniques for applying
model checking to JavaScript that strikes a balance of low runtime overhead and fine-grained policy
enforcement that other techniques do not achieve.
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Introduction
Web technologies have become essential to the proper functioning of our society.
Websites and web applications are now the standard method of communicating for
business and pleasure. Additionally, many commonly used web services are available as
a hybrid mobile application, a smartphone app developed using web technologies. Mobile
applications for many commonly used web services such as Gmail, Twitter, and
Instagram are implemented as hybrid mobile applications because the majority of the
code can be copied from the website implementation reducing the total amount of code
that needs to be maintained. Furthermore, the advent of Node.js allowed even server-side
code to be written in the same language as the front-end website code.
The language in which the behavior of such web services is implemented is called
JavaScript—a dynamic and permissive language that was not developed to tackle the
security challenges it faces today. Its lack of security features and error checking makes it
easy for the developer to overlook programming mistakes. Its complex and ill-defined
specification makes it difficult for the consumer to read and analyze. JavaScript and web
security have been the subject of much research since the language’s inception and the
growth of the web, but no definitive solution to JavaScript's security problems has been
implemented on a large scale.
The current security standards for handling sensitive information on the web is the
same as standards for handling physical property. Websites and hybrid mobile apps are
expected to come with a privacy policy, an agreement between the software developer
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and the end user about how the user’s information will be used. The privacy policy is
enforced with threat of legal action upon violation. This security standard offers very
little control to users over their own private information and device usage because legal
restrictions can be and frequently are broken with little to no repercussions.
Formal methods of software verification and enforcement offer promising tools
for users to gain some level of confidence in the security of the software they use. But
currently, the study and implementation of robust formal methods is confined to
academic research and big industry. The aim of this work is to study the applicability of
formal methods to JavaScript with the eventual goal of integrating formal methods into a
tool for user-specified policy enforcement and verification. Additionally, several methods
are proposed for providing simplistic model-checking support for JavaScript. There is
little research studying the integration of model-checking with the web environment since
it is traditionally studied in the context of embedded systems and electronic circuits.
However, model-checking has the potential to verify simple security policies relevant to
end-users.
This thesis is being conducted within the Intelligent Systems Security Lab, whose
research goals include offering software security and privacy solutions to average users.
This thesis provides a survey of formal verification tools and techniques for JavaScript
among other languages and discusses ways that a specific verification technique called
model checking can be implemented for JavaScript.
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Formal Methods Overview
Formal methods or formal verification is the use of mathematical modeling and
reasoning to prove that software always exhibits correct intended behavior and never
unintended behavior. Many software insecurities arise from a mismatch between the
behavior that developers expect the software to exhibit and the actual exhibited behavior
of the final product. These mismatches can arise from either under-specification or
mistakes in the implementation. Under-specification occurs when the programmer does
not know the exact intended behavior of a software system. Often a programmer will not
realize that certain behavior is undesirable until the program exhibits that behavior. This
could cause the programmer to make arbitrary implementation choices in situations
where the exact behavior of the system is assumed to be unimportant. Implementation
mistakes arise when the programmer understands the intended behavior, but fails to write
code that properly exhibits this behavior. This is often caused by a lack of understanding
or assumptions made about the programming language’s proper semantics.
The purpose of Formal Methods is to reduce or eliminate both of these sources of
software mistakes. Under-specification can be avoided by using formal specification
languages that require every possible input to the program to be properly considered, and
implementation mistakes can be avoided by mathematically connecting the concrete
program to an abstract specification. Formal methods achieve safety guarantees by
relying on precise mathematical modeling and proof techniques. This requires
traditionally informal concepts such as a “program” or “safety” to be represented in
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formal, machine-readable language. Any system of formal software verification has three
fundamental components:
1. A formal language or modeling system for describing software programs.
2. A formal language for expressing properties of programs.
3. An algorithm that evaluates a program model against a property expressed in
the formal property language.
Since software programs are fundamentally just complex state transition systems,
they are usually modeled as such. A transition system describes how a system in a given
“current configuration” (i.e. current state), can evolve over time into other configurations
via a set of predefined transitions. In a typical imperative programming language, the
state of the program consists of the values assumed by all of its variables or the data
stored in relevant sections of memory. The transitions would be the program statements
themselves that describe how the state is modified over the course of an execution.
Program properties, or policies, can be expressed in one of several ways
depending on the verification method being used. Like programs, a property can simply
be a transition system that defines the valid ways that the program is allowed to
transition. However, properties can also be expressed in propositional or first-order logic,
temporal logics, or as a set of reachable states among other methods.
Proof-based Verification
Proof-based verification is one of the two major branches of formal verification
techniques. A proof-based verification technique is any technique where the program and
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properties are represented as logical formulas. Verification under a proof-based modeling
system means performing a logical deduction starting from the program’s formulas to the
desired property.
The most commonly used proof-based verification method for imperative
programs is called Hoare Logic which encodes a program as a set of preconditionstatement-postcondition triples. A Hoare triple is a statement of the form {𝜙𝜙}𝐶𝐶{𝜓𝜓} where
𝐶𝐶 is a program and 𝜙𝜙 and 𝜓𝜓 are logical formulas that express properties about the

program state. The statement {𝜙𝜙}𝐶𝐶{𝜓𝜓} means “if condition 𝜙𝜙 holds before program 𝐶𝐶 is
executed, then condition 𝜓𝜓 will hold after 𝐶𝐶 is executed.” For example, if skip

represents a program that performs no action, then any Hoare triple {𝜙𝜙}𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠{𝜙𝜙} will be

true. As another example, suppose x := e; is a program that evaluates an expression e
and stores the result in a variable x, then {𝜙𝜙[𝑥𝑥 → 𝑒𝑒]}𝑥𝑥 ≔ 𝑒𝑒; {𝜙𝜙} will be true (𝜙𝜙[𝑥𝑥 → 𝑒𝑒]
represents the formula 𝜙𝜙 with all occurrences of 𝑥𝑥 replaced with 𝑒𝑒).

In Hoare Logic, a property is a precondition-postcondition pair (𝜙𝜙, 𝜓𝜓), and a

proof that a program 𝑃𝑃 satisfies the property is a derivation of the statement {𝜙𝜙}𝑃𝑃{𝜓𝜓}.

This derivation is constructed by breaking down 𝑃𝑃 into smaller programs, constructing

proofs for each subprogram, and combining the resulting proofs into a single program for
𝑃𝑃. For example, suppose 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑠𝑠1 ; 𝑠𝑠2 is a program that executes the two statements 𝑠𝑠1 and

𝑠𝑠2 in sequence. Then we could derive {𝜙𝜙}𝑠𝑠1 ; 𝑠𝑠2 {𝜓𝜓} if we had Hoare triples {𝜙𝜙}𝑠𝑠1 {𝜈𝜈} and

{𝜈𝜈}𝑠𝑠2 {𝜓𝜓} where 𝜈𝜈 is some intermediate condition.
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Proof-based verification offers the benefits of being direct and flexible. Programs
don’t need to undergo significant translation in order to reason about them. Hoare logic
can directly reason about common programming constructs such as if-statements and
while-loops which eliminates errors from being introduced during translation. However,
proof-based verification is also difficult to automate. As with proofs in other areas of
math, it is not trivial to determine how to combine the atomic propositions to reach the
desired conclusion.
Model Checking
The other major branch of formal verification is model-based verification where
the program is transformed into some abstract model (usually a state-transition system)
before verification. Model Checking is a particular method of model-based verification,
but it is general enough to be representative of the entire model-based strategy, so this
thesis will largely omit discussion of other model-based methods.
Model Checking is a formal verification system that verifies temporal properties
against a program represented as a finite-state transition system. There is no single
standard way to encode programs as transition systems. One such encoding is called a
Kripke structure, a triple (𝑆𝑆, 𝑅𝑅, 𝐼𝐼) where 𝑆𝑆 is a set of program states and 𝐼𝐼 is a mapping
from states to sets of atomic propositions. 𝑅𝑅 ⊆ 𝑆𝑆 × 𝑆𝑆 is the transition relation that

specifies which states the program can evolve into from the current state. For

deterministic programs, 𝑅𝑅 can be a function 𝑆𝑆 → 𝑆𝑆. A program can also be modeled as a
labeled transition system (𝑆𝑆, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, →) where 𝑆𝑆 is the set of states, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is a set of actions
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that can be taken by a program. The arrow →⊆ 𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 × 𝑆𝑆 is a three-way relation that
describes which states evolve into which other states when some action is performed.

The power of model checkers comes from their ability to verify policies written in
a temporal logic. A temporal property is a restriction on the order in which states can be
reached. A simple example of a temporal property is a no-send-after-read property which
says that if the program performs some “read” action (such as fetching information from
the user’s photo album or contacts list), then the program is not allowed to subsequently
perform a “send” action (such as transmitting data to a remote server). More formally a
temporal property restricts which traces a program is allowed to step through. A valid
trace or path is an infinite sequence of states 𝑠𝑠1 , 𝑠𝑠2 , … such that for each pair of adjacent
states 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+1, there is a valid transition from 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 to 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+1 in the transition relation.

Temporal properties can be expressed in two main formalisms. The first is linear-

temporal logic (LTL), an extension of first-order logic that includes constructs for
reasoning about changing properties over time. These two constructs are the X and U
operators. If 𝜙𝜙 and 𝜓𝜓 are LTL formulas, then 𝑋𝑋 𝜓𝜓 means 𝜓𝜓 is true for every possible next

state of the system, and 𝜙𝜙 𝑈𝑈 𝜓𝜓 means that 𝜙𝜙 remains true at least until the system reaches
a state where 𝜓𝜓 is true. Other temporal operators can be defined in terms of these two

constructs such as 𝐺𝐺 𝜓𝜓 meaning “𝜓𝜓 will always (globally) be true” and 𝐹𝐹 𝜓𝜓 meaning “𝜓𝜓

is guaranteed to eventually be true after a finite number of transitions”. Linear temporal
logic is the property language used by the SPIN model checker discussed below.

The other temporal logic is computation tree logic (CTL) which introduces trace
quantifiers A (for all traces) and E (there exists a trace) in addition to the X and U
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operators. These quantifiers allow for expressing that it is possible for some property to
be true, but the execution of the program might not follow the trace that holds that
property. In CTL, a trace quantifier or a temporal operator cannot stand by itself. CTL
can express properties about “every state in every trace” or “every state in at least one
trace”, but does not allow for reasoning about “every trace” directly. CTL is the temporal
language used by the NuSMV model checker.
Because there are many languages that may need model checking, popular
general-purpose model checkers generally implement model checking on a simpler
custom language called a modeling language. To use a general-purpose model checker, a
developer would need to translate their program from the language in which it was
written into the modeling language of the model checker. SPIN and NuSMV are both
general purpose model checkers that follow this design philosophy. SPIN (which stands
for Simple Promela Interpreter) operates on C-inspired meta-language called Promela.
SPIN is useful for verifying properties of concurrent programs because of Promela’s
built-in support for processes. The input language for NuSMV is much closer to a direct
specification language for finite-state machines which makes NuSMV less amenable to
software-verification than SPIN. However, NuSMV makes up for it in speed, support for
CTL logic in addition to LTL, and more advanced model checking techniques such as
bounded model checking.
There are, however, model checking tools available for widely used practical
programming languages. CPAchecker is a hybrid tool for model-checking and dataflow
analysis (discussed below) that operates directly on the C language. Policies are specified
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using LTL or a policy automaton. Java PathFinder is a similar tool for Java. These tools
must deal with aspects of real programming languages such as floating-point arithmetic,
dynamically-sized data structures, and pointer manipulation that most general-purpose
model checkers intentionally avoid. Consequently, they run slower and produce more
confusing failure analysis.
State-space Exploration Beyond Model Checking
While model checking encapsulates most other verification techniques centered
around traversing the program’s state-space, the simplifications made by other techniques
are worth mentioning. These other techniques are not applicable for verifying temporal
properties, only for determining reachability of a state or set of states from the program’s
starting state.
A dataflow analysis requires states to be expressed as a tuple of values
(𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) which represent variable bindings. Dataflow simplifies the state-space

search by eliminating information about how the fields of the state relate to each other.
Specifically, if a variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 assumes a value 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 in some reachable state 𝑠𝑠1 , and a variable
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 assumes 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 in some other reachable state 𝑠𝑠2 , then a dataflow analysis will assume that

there is some reachable state where both 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 assume those values simultaneously.
Instead of maintaining a set of reachable states, the algorithm only needs to maintain a
much smaller set of reachable values for each variable. This dodges the state-space
explosion problem that model checking has because the amount of memory needed to
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store the set of reachable states is now linear instead of exponential in the number of
variables.
Symbolic execution is more directly geared toward analyzing software programs
than model checking. A symbolic executor will interpret a program by initializing
program variables to symbolic values. When operations are performed on these symbolic
values, the computations that would be performed are simply saved in the form of a
mathematical expression. When the symbolic execution is complete, state-reachability
properties can be verified by analyzing the resulting expressions for each program
variable.
Information Flow
With regard to information privacy in particular, policies often need to talk about
the history of a piece of data, not just its contents. An information-flow policy restricts
the actions a program can perform on a piece of data based on the history of function
calls and computations that generated the data. For example, the standard web
environment provides a JavaScript API function getcurrentposition that asks the
browser to determine the current geolocation coordinates of the device using GPS or
other means. Apps and websites often passively collect geolocation coordinates just for
information gathering purposes. The user might want to block this passive collection
while allowing the coordinates to be used for desired tasks such as navigation in a Maps
application.
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Information-flow properties of a program can be verified statically using a form
of abstract interpretation, but currently it is more common to guarantee safety by
enforcing information-flow such policies at runtime. Enforcement usually involves
modification of the runtime environment or heavy instrumentation of the program code.
While information-flow policies are very expressive and relevant to most users, runtime
enforcement usually entails significant overhead. The most common way of enforcing
information-flow is a technique called secure multi-execution which, as the name implies,
requires executing the program multiple times concurrently causing the program to run at
least several times slower.
The significant enforcement overhead is required since information flow policies
are, in general, more fine-grained than temporal policies. Enforcing a no-send-after-read
policy is one way of making sure information does not leak out of a program, but since
any send after any read is blocked, plenty of benign “send” actions will also be blocked
despite not containing any sensitive information. Information flow policies can often
express more accurately the precise behaviors that the user wants to allow and block
without over- or undercompensating.

JavaScript & Web Security Survey
Here, we examine the current state-of-the-art verification tools for JavaScript that
make use of the formal verification techniques discussed above. Most work in JavaScript
language-based security can be categorized into one of three categories. Formalizing the
semantics of JavaScript means mathematically describing the precise procedure for the
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execution of a JavaScript program which has been hitherto informal. Proper formalization
of the language semantics provides the groundwork for the other two methods of static
policy verification and dynamic policy enforcement.
Formalizing JavaScript Semantics
Any solid verification framework must be based on a precise, formal
understanding of the execution of a program. Unfortunately, JavaScript interpreters were
built ad-hoc, so their behavior is not fully understood. JavaScript’s runtime semantics are
described informally as the ECMAScript specification, but this specification is lengthy
and includes ambiguities. Therefore, the past two decades have seen a number of
attempts to formalize the semantics of JavaScript. In 2008, Maffeis et. al. defined the first
operational semantics for JavaScript. The first mechanized semantics was JSCert (Bodin,
2014), a formalization of the JavaScript semantics in the Coq theorem-prover. The Coq
semantics have the benefit of being mechanized making them easier to work with without
making mistakes. However, using the semantics in theorem proving is still only semiautomatic and requires a lot of human intervention. In 2015, Park et. al. modeled the
JavaScript semantics in the K-semantics framework. The K system automatically
generates a parser and model-checker for the semantics.
JavaScript is a very large language and formalizing the entire specification is a
huge undertaking. Furthermore, the formalized semantics, while being complete, would
not be tractable enough to implement in practice. These concerns prompted Guha et. al.
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to take a different approach: defining a smaller language called lambda-JS with fewer
constructs and translating JavaScript into lambda-JS via a “desugaring process”.
Static Verification
Automatic program verification did not start being developed until later. A major
step forward in automatic JavaScript verification is the symbolic execution tool JaVerT
(JavaScript Verification Tool) (Fragoso Santos, 2019). JaVerT allows users to verify
precondition-postcondition properties similar to how one would with a proof-based
verification system. JaVerT is built on separation logic, an extension of Hoare Logic that
enables reasoning about programs that manipulate pointer values and more complex data
structures. JaVerT allows verification to be compositional—proven properties of
individual functions of a program can be combined into properties of the program as a
whole.
The verification of individual functions of a program is an important part of
verification, however the input-output policy specification limits JaVerT’s ability to
handle programs that, in theory, are designed to run indefinitely. Unfortunately, most web
programs are designed to handle various events and callbacks such as mouse clicks or
displaying information in real time which requires an execution thread to be alive
indefinitely.
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Dynamic Policy Enforcement
Infrastructure for analyzing information flow through JavaScript programs has
been implemented by JSFlow (Hedin, 2014) and FlowFox (De Groef, 2012). JSFlow is
implemented as an extension to the Firefox web browser. FlowFox is implemented as a
modified Firefox browser.
Phung et. al. (2009) proposed a policy enforcement technique called lightweight
self-protecting JavaScript where a JavaScript program is modified before runtime to
monitor calls to built-in API functions. This technique exploits the fact that JavaScript
allows any code to redefine global variables. Since applications are given access to user’s
data via JavaScript API functions bound to variables, these API functions can be
“rewritten” to implement a desired security policy.
The desired policy is enforced via an inlining process that occurs after the
sensitive API functions are defined. Suppose the policy requires restricting access to the
function getPosition in the nav.geoloc object. Before any untrusted code is
executed, a reference to the original getPosition function is saved to be accessed
later by the enforcement code. The enforcement code is then defined as a JavaScript
function and assigned to the global variable nav.geoloc.getPosition overwriting
the reference to the original function. Upon invocation, this new function will check if the
calling the original sensitive API function will cause a policy violation. If not, execution
proceeds with the original invocation, otherwise the original invocation is blocked.
The benefits of self-protecting JavaScript are the ease of implementation and
small runtime overhead. The inlining code can be implemented in JavaScript itself and
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injected into a website or hybrid mobile application by an additional script inclusion.
Unlike information flow, runtime overhead only occurs at the beginning of the execution
(to load the enforcement script) and when the untrusted code attempts to call a sensitive
API function.
However, the policies that are enforceable by self-protecting JavaScript are
limited when compared to other methods. No monitoring of the behavior of the untrusted
code is done apart from calls to API functions. This means information flow policies
cannot be enforced directly as it is not possible to track information as it is passed
between variables. The primary set of policies that can be handled are temporal policies
on the set of monitored API functions, which prompts the use of model checking to verify
the soundness of the enforcement. The next section discusses several strategies for
integrating model checking with JavaScript.

Proposed JavaScript Model Checking Framework
One of the main goals of this thesis was to develop a method of implementing
model checking for JavaScript. To our knowledge, there is no widely used existing tool
for validating JavaScript code using model checking. There are also many security
policies relevant to end-users that can be expressed as temporal properties. Users may
want to limit the frequency of certain actions to combat passive information gathering or
restrict reading and sending personal information. Temporal properties are also easily
enforced using lightweight self-protecting JavaScript, so interoperability between the
policy enforcement mechanism and the static policy validation method could be possible.
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Since constructing a model checker from scratch would be time consuming,
instead a series of translators were built from JavaScript into other languages with
dedicated model checking tools. The following subsections discuss implementations of
translators to C and NuSMV as well as a strategy for encoding JavaScript programs and
temporal policies in Datalog.
Building such a translator requires overcoming two major hurdles. The first
challenge is deciding how much of the JavaScript syntax and semantics should be
supported by the translator. Enough of the language needs to be supported to be useful,
but supporting the entire language would be infeasible. The second challenge is
developing a method of formal abstraction for the translator, or a set of formal guidelines
that detail the amount and kinds of details that are preserved and discarded during the
translation.
JavaScript to C Translation
The C language is a good candidate for a target language because of its variety of
matured analysis tools such as CPAchecker. It is also much more expressive than general
purpose modeling languages such as Promela which were not designed to be executed as
normal programs. The C language is powerful enough to emulate key JavaScript features
like dynamic typing and IEEE-754 floating-point arithmetic. To take advantage of the
benefits of C, we have developed a prototype translator called JS2C which preserves the
semantics of the original JavaScript program as much as possible. More specific
information including code snippets can be found in Appendix A.
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Dynamic typing is emulated in C by representing all possible JavaScript values
inside a structure called JSVar which contains type information in addition to the value
itself. Values of primitive types such as number and boolean in JavaScript are easily
mapped to instances of JSVar in C. Likewise, all JavaScript operators and functions are
mapped to C functions that operate on JSVar instances. Currently, only non-dynamic
primitive types are supported, but support for JavaScript objects and strings could be
supported in the future using the heap and careful memory management. First-class
functions could possibly be implemented using function pointers. More advanced
features like dynamic code generation and the eval construct might not be feasibly
supported.
JavaScript to NuSMV Translation
While translation to C would be more direct, making simplifications during the
translation is in many cases desirable because reducing complexity reduces the likelihood
of introducing errors. Additionally, if the code being analyzed is intended to be policy
enforcement code such as the code injected by self-protecting JavaScript, then support for
more complex JavaScript semantics might not even be necessary. Enforcement code
should only be constructed using simple language constructs anyway to avoid
complexity. The prototype JS2NuSMV translates JavaScript programs that follow precise
formatting guidelines into a representative NuSMV module.
Additionally, our code instruments the original JavaScript to bring the semantics
of the original program closer to the semantics of the NuSMV language. This is
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accomplished by injecting calls to custom JavaScript to make sure that type checking or
arithmetic operators are performed correctly. For example, a call to a function opADD
will be substituted for each use of JavaScript’s addition operator. This function is lesspermissive than the addition operator performing only 32-bit signed integer arithmetic
and throwing an exception for invalid arguments. The modified JavaScript program could
then theoretically be deployed instead of the original written JavaScript for extra safety
guarantees at the cost of some runtime overhead.
This method provides the benefit of flexibility, but places heavy restrictions on
what constructs are allowed in a JavaScript input program. Features like dynamic typing,
floating-point arithmetic, and function calls are often difficult to implement in modeling
languages, and implementing dynamic code generation and eval seems practically
impossible.
Datalog Implementation
Implementing a translation from one syntax to another can be confusing and
inelegant. Another option is to encode information about JavaScript programs in Datalog,
a logic-programming language based on the concepts of facts and rules. A fact is a
construct of the form predicate(obj1,

obj2, …)

that specifies some relationship between

the objects in the parentheses. A rule specifies how to derive a fact given a set of other
facts. Given a set of initial facts and rules, Datalog will find all facts that can be derived
by repeated application of the rules.
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Information about the reachability of program states can be encoded using a fact
path(s1, s2)

which means that there exists a sequence of valid transitions from state s1

to state s2. The path predicate satisfies a transitive property that can be encoded as the
rule path(s1,

s3) :- path(s1, s2), path(s2, s3).

The path predicate can be used to verify some temporal policies like the no-sendafter-read policy. First, the program statements need to be encoded as corresponding rules
involving path. Suppose in state 𝑠𝑠1, the program has just performed a “read” action while
in 𝑠𝑠2, the program has just performed a “send” action. Then the policy is violated if the
Datalog system is able to derive any such rule path(s1,

s2).

Appendix C includes an

example of how a specific program can be encoded and verified.
Automaton Encoding in JavaScript
One of the major challenges of formal verification is properly abstracting a
program written in a practical programming language such as JavaScript into a
mathematical model. Verifying properties on a general program requires dealing with the
complex semantics of the language in which it was written. However, if we turn our
focus away from policy verification to policy enforcement, the task becomes easier. This
section describes a method of generating self-protecting JavaScript enforcement code that
is correct with reasonable certainty.
Suppose that we want to enforce a temporal property that restricts access to a set
of global API functions. We will express the property as a transition system 𝐴𝐴 =

(𝑆𝑆, 𝑀𝑀, 𝛿𝛿) where 𝑆𝑆 is a set of states, 𝑀𝑀 is the set of sensitive API functions that need to be
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monitored, and 𝛿𝛿: 𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀 → 𝑆𝑆 ∪ {undefined} is a partial function mapping state-

transition pairs to next states. A sequence of method calls 𝑚𝑚1 , 𝑚𝑚2 , … , 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 starting from an
initial state 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is considered safe if 𝛿𝛿(⋯ 𝛿𝛿(𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑚𝑚1 ), 𝑚𝑚2 ) ⋯ , 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 ) ≠ undefined.

We can enforce this temporal property onto untrusted code by using self-

protecting JavaScript. The enforcement code will keep track of the state of the program
as the untrusted code calls API functions. If the untrusted code attempts to take a
transition that does not exist, the enforcement code will block the call so that the security
state remains defined. Each call to an API function 𝑚𝑚 must be replaced with an

enforcement method that performs the following:
1. 𝑠𝑠’ ← 𝛿𝛿(𝑠𝑠, 𝑚𝑚);

2. 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠’ ≠ undefined) { 𝑠𝑠 ← 𝑠𝑠’; 𝑚𝑚(arguments); }

We can implement an automaton in JavaScript directly. If the number of security

states and monitored methods is finite and tractable, the states and transitions can be
encoded in JavaScript as string values and the transition function 𝛿𝛿 can be encoded as an
object delta where delta[“s”][“m”] evaluates to either a new state or

undefined. For example, a reduce-reset policy with six states and two transition
functions is easily representable:
var reduceResetAutomaton = {
"initialstate": "5",
"transitions": {
"0": {"reset": "5"},

"1": {"reduce": "0", "reset": "5"},
"2": {"reduce": "1", "reset": "5"},
"3": {"reduce": "2", "reset": "5"},
"4": {"reduce": "3", "reset": "5"},
"5": {"reduce": "4", "reset": "5"}
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};

}

The benefit of encoding the security policy directly in JavaScript is that the same
monitor code can be used for all security policies. This means that a proof of correctness
of the enforcement mechanism would come down to proving properties of a small
amount of fixed JavaScript code instead of general JavaScript programs.

Conclusion
A step toward the development of lightweight user-centered verification of
JavaScript is developing model checking support for JavaScript software. This paper
presented implementations of translators from JavaScript into C and NuSMV which
demonstrate the usefulness and feasibility applying model checking. Future work should
include the implementation of a full JavaScript model checking pipeline. Ideally, a single
tool would handle both the abstraction of JavaScript programs into models and the model
checking itself. However, the abstraction and validation processes could remain separate
components. Significant effort would need to be put into formalizing the abstraction of
JavaScript programs based on a mechanized JavaScript semantics. Additionally, there
will almost certainly be aspects of JavaScript that a model checking tool would not be
able to properly handle, so a rigorous specification of allowable input programs must also
be developed. Such a tool could become the basis for new information security standards
for the web based on demonstrable proof of policy adherence instead of trust of
adherence to legal obligations.
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While significant progress has been made on language-based web security, our
ability to analyze the security of JavaScript and provide safety guarantees is still limited.
Static analysis tools like JaVerT are big steps forward, but still only have limited uses and
adoption. Information flow enforcement tools like JSFlow and FlowFox are good
demonstrations of the feasibility of information flow analysis for JavaScript. However,
significant runtime overhead and incompatibility with some webpages hinder their
potential for practical use. Lightweight runtime monitoring techniques such as Phung’s
self-protecting JavaScript are most likely able to provide the desired balance between
policy expressivity and efficiency. However, confidence of the soundness of the
implementation will only come with a close comparison with formal JavaScript
semantics. and a formalization of the enforcement code needs to be done to gain more
confidence that the enforcement is sound and tamper-proof. As technology improves and
more research is conducted, a workable solution to JavaScript security should come into
focus sometime in the near future.
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Appendix A: JS2C Implementation Details
JS2C prepends its output C file with a prelude that emulates JavaScript’s
semantics with C structures and functions. Below is a sample of the constructs included.

// Numbers, Booleans, and undefined types are supported
enum JSType {JSnumber, JSboolean, JSundefined};
typedef union {
double asNum;

long asBool;
unsigned long asHex;

} JSVal;

// A JavaScript type coupled with data
typedef struct {
enum JSType type;
JSVal val;

} JSVar;

// Common values are represented using macros
#define jsTrue ((JSVar){JSboolean, {.asBool = 1}})
// Implicit operations defined in the ECMAScript specification
// are implemented as C functions.
JSVar ToBoolean(JSVar v) {

return ((v.type == JSboolean) ? v :
(v.type == JSundefined) ? jsFalse :
(v.val.asNum == 0.0) ? jsFalse :
(ISNAN(v.val.asHex)) ? jsFalse :

}

jsTrue);

// The semantics of JavaScript operators are emulated as C functions.
JSVar jsAND(JSVar x, JSVar y) {
return (ToBoolean(x).val.asBool) ? y : x;
}
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Appendix B: JS2NuSMV Implementation Details
JS2NuSMV prepends a prelude to the modified JavaScript program that redefines
common operators. Below is an example of the redefinition of the JavaScript addition “+”
operator to only perform signed 32-bit integer arithmetic:
function opADD(x, y) {

if (!Number.isInteger(x) || !Number.isInteger(y))
throw "Arguments must be integers";
var result = x + y;
if (result >= 2**31)

result -= 2**32;
else if (result < -(2**31))

}

result += 2**32;
return result;
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Appendix C: Datalog Verification Details
The code below is a simple representation of enforcement code that implements a
no-send-after-read policy. The functions trySend and tryRead represent public API
functions exposed to the untrusted code while the functions send and read represent the
sensitive API functions that need to be monitored. The enforcement code acts as a
mediator between the untrusted and sensitive code bases.
var canSend = true;
function trySend() {
if (canSend) send();
}

function tryRead() {
canSend = false;
}

read();

This enforcement code is modeled as the following Datalog program. The
program state is represented as a pair (𝑐𝑐, 𝑎𝑎) where 𝑐𝑐 ∈ {true, false} represents the value

of the canSend variable and 𝑎𝑎 ∈ {none, send, read} is the last sensitive API function that

was called. The predicate path(c1,

a1, c2, a2)

means there is a path from state (𝑐𝑐1, 𝑎𝑎1)

to state (𝑐𝑐2, 𝑎𝑎2). The functions trySend and tryRead are each translated into a set of rules
that describe the action performed and the value of canSend after calling the function.

% start state is reachable

path(true, none, true, none). canSend
% models the behavior of trySend
path(true, A, true, send) :- path(true, none, true, A).

path(false, A, false, none) :- path(true, none, false, A).
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% models the behavior of tryRead
path(C, A, false, read) :- path(true, none, C, A).
% transitive property

path(C1, A1, C3, A3) :- path(C1, A1, C2, A2),
path(C2, A2, C3, A3).

The no-send-after-read policy is satisfied if and only if the query “path(C1,
C2, send)?”

read,

returns any facts. The presence of such a fact would mean that that a send

was performed after a read, and that these two states are reachable from the starting state.
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Appendix D: Automaton-based Encoding Details
A temporal policy can be enforced in JavaScript by using self-protecting
JavaScript to inject a security automaton into a program. The security automaton is
represented as an object in JSON format. Below is an example of a reduce-reset
automaton that allows a “reduce” action to be performed a maximum of five consecutive
times before a “reset” action is taken.
var reduceResetAutomaton = {
"initialstate": "5",
"transitions": {

"0": {"reset": "5"},
"1": {"reduce": "0", "reset": "5"},
"2": {"reduce": "1", "reset": "5"},
"3": {"reduce": "2", "reset": "5"},

};

}

"4": {"reduce": "3", "reset": "5"},
"5": {"reduce": "4", "reset": "5"}

The abstract transitions need to be associated with method calls in the JavaScript
program. This can be done by defining a transitionbindings object. When the untrusted
code calls a sensitive API function, the corresponding abstract transition is retrieved from
this object.
var transitionbindings = [
{"object": api, "method": "sendSMS", "transition": "reduce"},
];

{"object": window, "method": "handlereset", "transition": "reset"}

Finally, at the beginning of the program’s execution, the API functions need to be
rewritten as described by self-protecting JavaScript. This code rewrites each JavaScript
method in the transitionbindings. The new self-protecting methods transition the abstract
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state in parallel with the execution of the concrete program and block sensitive API calls
if the corresponding abstract transition is not present.
function enforceAutomaton (automaton, transitionbindings) {
var state = automaton.initialstate;
var getMonitorFunction = function (transition) {

return function (obj, func, args) {
newstate = automaton.transitions[state][transition];
if (newstate === undefined
|| !(newstate in automaton.transitions)) {

console.log("MONITOR: transition not allowed.");
return;

}
state = newstate;

};

};

console.log("MONITOR: new state is " + state);
func.apply(obj, args);

for (binding of transitionbindings) {

}

}

intercept(binding.object, binding.method,
getMonitorFunction(binding.transition));

